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LABOR LAW
Unfair Labor Practices * Evidentiary Hearing * Coercive Conduct
A TR Wire and Cable Co. v. NLRB
671 F.2d 188 (6th Cir. 1982)
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT is principally designed to promote
industrial harmony by encouraging collective bargaining and by pro-
tecting the right of workers to designate representatives to negotiate the terms
and conditions of their employment.' As its enforcing mechanism, the Act pro-
vides for the creation of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board).2
The Board's primary functions are to determine the employees' choice of a
bargaining representative and to protect the employees from unfair labor
practices.' Section 9 of the Act4 provides the NLRB with broad discretionary
powers to establish rules for conducting representation elections and for deter-
mining the validity of these elections. 5 Typically, proceedings to determine the
validity of election results tend to be more investigatory than adversarial in
nature. Accordingly, 29 C.F.R. § 102.696 gives an objecting party the right
'National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). For a discussion of social
and economic considerations in the formulation of national labor policy see St. Antoine, National Labor
Policy: Reflections and Distortions of Social Justice, 29 CATH. U. L. REV. 535 (1979).
'29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1976).
'COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE, INC., 1982 GUIDEBOOK TO LABOR RELATIONS (1982). Employer unfair labor
practices are defined in § 8(a) of the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1976). Union unfair labor practices are
set forth in § 8(b). 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1976).
'29 U.S.C. § 156 (1976).
'The Board's authority to conduct representation elections derives from § 9(c) of the Act. This section
states in relevant part: "If the Board finds ... that such question of representation exists, it shall direct
an election by secret ballot and shall certify the results thereof." 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1976). The details
of the conduct of the elections remains unspecified by the Act. R. WILLIAMS, P. JANUS, & K. HUHN, LABOR
RELATIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY SERIES, REPORT No. 8, at 4 (1974) [hereinafter cited as REPORT No. 8]. The
United States Supreme Court has interpreted this section as granting the NLRB broad discretionary powers
for promulgating procedural rules for conducting representation elections. NLRB v. A.J. Towers, Co.,
329 U.S. 324, 330-31 (1946).
Although the Administrative Procedures Act, 60 Stat. 273 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-03 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)), provides the Board with formal rule-making authority, the Board's
election policies have been developed on a case by case basis. REPORT No. 8, supra, at 7. See generally
Peck, A Critique of National Labor Relations Board's Performance in Policy Formulation: Adjudication
and Rule Making, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 254 (1968).
629 C.F.R. § 102.69 (1982). This section governs the processing of election objections. Id. For discussion
of NLRB election procedures, see T. KAMMHOLZ & K. MCGUINESS, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE BEFORE
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (2d ed. 1966).
[261]
1
McIntyre: ATR Wire and Cable Co. v. NLRB
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1984
AKRON LAW REVIEW
to an evidentiary hearing only when the Regional Director7 or the Board decides
that a material factual issue may be more appropriately resolved by a hearing.'
Traditionally, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has closely adhered to this
strict standard.' It has done so in compliance with one of the foremost policies
of the Act - the alleviation of labor unrest by expediently certifying bargain-
ing units. I'A TR Wire and Cable Co. v. NLRB, "I however, represents the cur-
rent willingness of the Sixth Circuit to de-emphasize the importance of expe-
diently certifying bargaining representatives. First, the circuit will not hesitate
to remand a case with direction to the NLRB to conduct an evidentiary hearing
when it determines that the Board adopted the Regional Director's recommen-
dation to certify a bargaining unit without reviewing the evidence upon which
the Director has relied. Secondly, the court will remand when the coercive con-
duct of union adherents prior to the election may have precluded the employees'
fair selection of bargaining representative.
7
"In order to keep pace with its burgeoning representation caseload, the Board, in 1961, exercised its authority
under section 3(b) of the Act to delegate its power in election cases to its regional directors." REPORT
No. 8, supra note 5, at 7.
'29 C.F.R. § 102.69(d) (1982). See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
'The Sixth Circuit, in the case of NLRB v. Tennessee Packers, Inc., 379 F.2d 1972 (6th Cir.), cert. denied
389 U.S. 958 (1967), found that the first union election had been properly set aside because the company
had interfered with the employees' free choice by adopting benefits shortly before the election.
The court ordered the company to bargain with the union and denied it a hearing on its election
objections. In so doing, the court established the rule that an objecting party must define its disagreements
with the Regional Director's report and offer evidence to support its contrary findings in order to entitle
it to an evidentiary hearing. Id. See generally Jackson & Heller, Promises and Grants of Benefits under
the National Labor Relations Act, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1982).
1029 U.S.C. § 151 (1976). Justice Brennan, in discussing Congress' intent in enacting the NLRA, emphasized
the conclusion of Congress "that the change for industrial peace increased correlatively to how quickly
collective bargaining commenced." Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 192 (1958) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Brennan further stressed Congress' intent to limit judicial review of certification orders. Such time-
consuming review might merely frustrate the policies of the Act and the promotion of industrial harmony.
Id. at 191-93 (Brennan, J., dissenting). (Dissenting from the majority view that the Act permits directjudicial review of the NLRB's determination of an appropriate bargaining unit).
The Fifth Circuit determined that the NLRA implicitly requires that representation questions be
expeditiously handled and post-election objection hearings be sparingly granted in order to promote the
policies of the Act and to prevent objecting parties from delaying the certification of legitimately victorious
bargaining units. NLRB v. O.K. Van Storage, Inc., 297 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1961).
The Supreme Court, in conformity with Congressional intent and the express mandate of § 10(e),
29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976), has determined that its scope of review of Board orders is limited to ascertaining
whether substantial evidence, considered on the record, as a whole supports the Board's action. See NLRB
v. A. J. Tower Co., 329 U. S. at 330-31; Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477-78 (1958).
Furthermore, the judiciary may not review Board actions de novo. Rather, it must limit its review to whether
the Board has acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 488. For further
discussion of the courts' acquiescence to Board expertise in regulating pre-election conduct, see Getman,
Goldberg, & Herman, NLRB Regulations of Campaign Tactics: The Behavioral Assumptions on which
the Board Regulates, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1465 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Behavioral Assumptions]. For
an empirical study questioning the Board's expertise, see Getman & Goldberg, The Myth of NLRB Expertise,
39 U. CHI. L. REV. 681 (1972).
"671 F.2d 188 (6th Cir. 1982).
[Vol. 17:2
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II. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
A representation election conducted at ATR Wire and Cable Company's
Kentucky plant resulted in a narrow, seven-vote victory for the Union.'I ATR
Wire filed timely objections with the Regional Director concerning the fairness
of the election. I3 The company raised eleven specific contentions accompanied
by employee affidavits alleging that threats and acts of vandalism by Union
proponents created a coercive atmosphere preventing a fair election.' 4
Upon receiving the election objections, the Regional Director conducted
an administrative investigation pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(d).I5 He obtained
the affidavit of a Union staff organizer.' 6 Relying exclusively upon this affiant's
disclaimer of Union responsibility for the threats and acts of vandalism by the
Union adherents, the Regional Director overruled the company's objections.
He then recommended that the Board certify the Union as the exclusive bargain-
ing representative of the ATR Wire employees."
ATR Wire submitted timely exceptions to the Regional Director's report.'8
Without first reviewing the evidence upon which the Director had based his
conclusions, the NLRB adopted the recommendations of the Director. '9 In so
doing, the NLRB ruled that ATR Wire's exceptions did not entitle it to a
hearing.2" It particularly noted the absence of evidence linking the Union with
the threats and acts of violence by the Union adherents. 2 ' Pursuant to the
authority of section 9, the Board certified the Union as the exclusive bargain-
ing representative of the ATR Wire employees.22
Such certification orders are not considered final orders within the mean-
ing of section 10(e) of the Act.2" Consequently, they are not subject to direct
judicial review by the federal appellate courts.24 Thus, in order to obtain judicial
"Id. at 189.
"Id.
'Id. The affiants alleged that the Union proponents had threatened them with physical harm and refusal
to cooperate at work. They further alleged that their cars had been vandalized shortly after they had publicly
expressed support for the company. Id.
'529 C.F.R. § 102.69(d) (1982). This section permits the Regional Director to determine whether election
objections are serious enough to warrant setting aside an election on the basis of an administrative
investigation or an evidentiary hearing. Id.







29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976).
'"American Fed'n of Labor v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401, 406-07 (1940). In order to obtain judicial review
an employer must follow a circuitous procedure. It must refuse to bargain with the union, subject itself
to an unfair labor practice proceeding, assert as its defense that the Board erred in the representation
proceedings, wait to be found guilty of an unfair labor practice, and seek judicial review of Board orders
Fall, 19831 RECENT CASES
3
McIntyre: ATR Wire and Cable Co. v. NLRB
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1984
review, ATR Wire committed an unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain
with the newly certified Union.25 In the unfair labor practice proceeding against
it, ATR Wire asserted as its defense that the Board had improperly certified
the Union. Finding ATR Wire guilty of this unfair labor practice, the NLRB
directed the company to bargain with the Union.26
Because Board orders are not self-executing,27 the Board, pursuant to
section 10(f) of the Act,28 petitioned the Sixth Circuit for enforcement of its
bargaining order. 29 ATR Wire was then entitled to have the circuit review the
certification order, since the court's denial or enforcement of the bargaining
order would depend upon the propriety of the Board's underlying certifica-
tion order.30
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals denied enforcement of the Board's
bargaining order. The court instead remanded the case to the Board, directing
it to conduct an evidentiary hearing on ATR Wire's election objections and
exceptions .31
The court ruled, in accordance with precedent, "[t]hat the Board abuses
its discretion by adopting a Regional Director's report if the Director fails to
transmit to the Board all the evidence upon which the Director relies." 32 The
court noted that the Board had abused its discretion in this case by adopting
the Director's report without having reviewed the affidavit of the Union staff
organizer. This affidavit, the court concluded, had clearly influenced the fac-
tual determinations of the Director. 33
Secondly, the court ruled that ATR Wire had sufficiently demonstrated
the existence of material issues entitling it to a hearing.3" Based upon the fifteen
employee affidavits, the court stressed that the pre-election atmosphere may
have rendered a fair election impossible despite broad participation in the elec-
tion, ability of the company proponents to attend Union meetings, and no in-
dication of coerced voting. 35 The court further determined that the question
directing it to bargain. Such an order by the Board under § 10(c) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151(c) (1976),
is directly reviewable by the federal appellate courts. Goldberg, District Court Review of NLRB
Representation Proceedings, 42 IND. L.J. 455-57 (1967).
"1671 F.2d at 189.
261d.
17C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, 874 (1971).
29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976).
29671 F.2d at 189.
"See Goldberg, supra note 24, at 456.
"1671 F.2d at 189.
12Id. at 190 (citing NLRB v. Curtis Noll Corp., 634 F.2d 1027 (6th Cir. 1980); Prestolite Wire Div. v.
NLRB, 592 F2d 302 (6th Cir. 1979)).
"1671 F.2d at 190.
[Vol. 17:2AKRON LAW REVIEW
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of Union responsibility for the threats and acts of vandalism would have been
more appropriately resolved through a hearing.36
Chief Judge Edwards delivered a strong dissenting opinion" based upon
the doctrine established by the Sixth Circuit in NLRB v. Tennessee Packers,
Inc." He implied that ATR Wire had failed to specifically state its controver-
sies with the Director's report or to proffer specific evidence supporting its con-
clusions as required by Tennessee Packers.39 Accordingly, he would have en-
forced the Board's bargaining order."'
The Chief Judge expressed his fear that the subsequent delays caused by
conducting hearings on all election exceptions would compromise the essential
purpose of the National Labor Relations Act." He warned against wide adop-
tion of the majority stance, stating:
The current delay in Board and Court processing of union certification
disputes (currently two years and nine months in this case) is already com-
pletely inconsistent with the purpose of the National Labor Relations Act.
For the courts routinely to return all election disputes for hearings will
create a strong tendency to take labor/management industrial conflicts
out of the National Labor Relations Board and judicial processes and
return them to the streets."2
III. NECESSITY FOR A HEARING ON ELECTION OBJECTIONS
Tennessee Packers established the standard that an objecting party must
meet in order to obtain an evidentiary hearing in the Sixth Circuit. 3 That court,
in enforcing a bargaining order against the employer, defined the rigid stan-
36Id.
37671 F.2d at 190 (Edwards, C. J., dissenting).
"Tennessee Packers, 379 F.2d at 172.
"1671 F.2d at 190.
,Old.
"Id. at 191.
"Id. For the fiscal years July, 1972, through September, 1978, the NLRB conducted 45,115 representation
elections. In cases where no objections were filed, the Board closed its proceedings in an average time
of 21 days. Where the unions objected, that closing time increased to approximately three months. Four
and one-half months were required to finalize election results where the employer filed objections. These
additional months are significant because union support tends to diminish as the length of time needed
to finalize election proceedings increases. Roomkin & Block, Case Processing Time and the Outcome of
the Representation Elections: Some Empirical Evidence, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 75-97. For a discussion of
how inconsistent NLRB adjudications provide objecting employers the opportunity to prolong finalizing
union victories in an effort to erode union support, to divert union resources from building an organization
to paying legal expenses, and to save the possible expense of increasing employee benefits, see Samoff,
NLRB Elections: Uncertainty and Certainty, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 228, 234-41 (1968).
4"379 F.2d at 178. In formulating this rule, the Sixth Circuit drew on opinions from the Third, Seventh
and Ninth Circuits, see, e.g., Macomb Pottery Co. v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 450 (7th Cir. 1967); NLRB v.
Sun Drug Co., 359 F.2d 408 (3d Cir. 1966); NLRB v. J. R. Simplot Co., 322 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1963).
Other circuits have expressly adopted this rule. See, e.g., NLRB v. Target Stores, 547 F.2d 421, 425
(8th Cir. 1977); United Steelworkers of Am. v. NLRB, 496 F.2d 1342, 1348 (5th Cir. 1974); NLRB v.
Americana Nursing Home, Inc., 459 F.2d 26, 28 (4th Cir. 1972); Lipman Motors, Inc. v. NLRB, 451
F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1971); Int'l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 418 F.2d 1191,
1196-97 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
Fall, 19831 RECENT CASES
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dard by stating, "[i]t is incumbent upon the party seeking a hearing to clearly
demonstrate that factual issues exist which can only be resolved by an eviden-
tiary hearing. The exceptions must state specific findings that are controverted
and must show what evidence will be presented to support a contrary finding
or conclusion." ' 4 The court further determined that the NLRB is entitled to
rely upon the report of the Regional Director when the objecting party has
failed to satisfy these two requisites.45
A TR Wire exemplifies a trend in the Sixth Circuit which maintains the
viability of the Tennessee Packers rule." The court will require a party seeking
a hearing to define its disputes and proffer evidence to support its contrary
conclusions. According to A TR Wire, however, the court will more readily
find that a party has fulfilled this strict evidentiary burden when the Board
has merely "rubber-stamped ' 4 the Regional Director's report and when the
conduct of Union adherents may have rendered impossible the free selection
of a bargaining representative by the employees.48
A. Failure to Transmit the Entire Record
The Tennessee Packers decision, although permitting the NLRB to rely
upon the Director's report when the objecting party failed to satisfy its burden,
did not address the Director's failure to transmit the entire record.49 Prestolite
Wire Div. v. NLRB, was the first case in the circuit to expressly characterize
the Board's certification of a bargaining unit without benefit of the record or
a hearing as an abuse of discretion."0 The court ruled that according to the
plain language of 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(g)," the Regional Director should have
transmitted the entire record of the administrative investigation to the Board.
5 2
Failure to transmit the entire record hindered the Board and the court in review-
ing the fairness of the credibility findings and factual determinations which
form the basis of the Director's recommendation."
"379 F.2d at 178.
,5Id.
"Subsequent decisions in the Sixth Circuit expressly reaffirm the viability of Tennessee Packers but hold
that only in proper cases may election objections be resolved on the basis of an administrative investigation
alone. See, e.g., NLRB v. North Elec. Co., 644 F.2d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 1981); Prestolite Wire Div. v.
NLRB, 592 F.2d 302, 305 (6th Cir. 1979).
"North Elec., 644 F.2d at 584. The court used this term to describe the activity of the Board when it
adopts the Regional Director's report without reviewing the underlying evidence. The court termed the
Board's failure as an abdication of its responsibilities under the Act. Id.
"ATR Wire, 671 F.2d 188.
41379 F.2d at 178.
"0592 F.2d at 307. Accord NLRB v. Eskimo Radiator Mfg. Co., 688 F.2d 1315, 1318 (9th Cir. 1982);
NLRB v. Cambridge Wire Cloth Co., 622 F.2d 1195, 1198-99 (4th Cir. 1980).
"-29 C.F.R. § 102.69(g) (1982). This section describes the record to be transmitted to the Board as containing
a stenographic report of the hearing, exceptions, and documentary evidence, together with objections,
briefs, or other legal memoranda submitted by the parties, and the decision of the Regional Director. Id.
12Prestolite Wire, 592 F.2d at 305. The court concluded that absent the 19 employee affidavits recounting
union threats as well as the evidence gathered by the Director, the Board could not have fairly considered
Prestolite's 73 objections. Id. at 306.
53/d.
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Two years after Prestolite Wire, the Sixth Circuit decided NLRB v. North
Electric Co. Presenting the identical procedural posture as Prestolite Wire, 
4
the court once again determined that the Board abuses its discretion by adopt-
ing the Regional Director's report when the Director has failed to transmit
the entire record.55 In addition, the court discussed the remedial steps available
upon a determination that the Board has abused its discretion in this manner.
5 6
First, the court must construe the factual assertions in the objections most
favorably to the objecting party.57 If the objections raise substantial factual
disputes with the Director's report, then the court may direct the Board to con-
duct an evidentiary hearing.58 If, however, the assertions fail to raise substan-
tial factual controversies, the court has the option of instructing the Board to
reconsider the Director's report in conjunction with the evidence in the record.59
Through A TR Wire, Prestolite Wire, and North Electric, the Sixth Cir-
cuit has attempted to more clearly define the applicability of the rule established
in Tennessee Packers. The majority opinions in these cases do not contravene
the policy of the NLRA which encourages the expedient certification of bargain-
ing units in order to promote industrial harmony. Nor do they require the Board
to conduct detailed hearings in practically every representation election wherein
the union prevails.
The Board may still, in accordance with Tennessee Packers, rely upon the
report of the Regional Director in those "situations where the objections
themselves may be 'shotgunned' or so lacking in factual detail that they may
be denied both by the Regional Director and by the Board entirely without
recourse to the administrative record. "60 The Board is excused from reviewing
the underlying documentation in these cases on the theory that the failure to
do so could not possibly prejudice the objecting party's case. 61 In cases where
"North Elec., 644 F.2d at 584.
"Id. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
"Id. at 584-85.
"Id. at 584.
"Id. Although a party is entitled to a review of its election objections, Board rules do not provide for
an evidentiary hearing on those objections in every case. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. Once
a party has established its right to a hearing, the Fifth Circuit has held "[that] the investigation is not
a substitute for it. The hearing may not be denied on the basis of new information obtained exparte by
the regional director." NLRB v. Claxton Mfg. Co., Inc., 613 F.2d 1364, 1366 (5th Cir. 1980). Accord
Anchor Inns, Inc. v. NLRB, 644 F.2d 292 (3d. Cir. 1981). It appears likewise that the Sixth Circuit has
adopted this reasoning in A TR Wire. The court stated that the substantial factual disputes concerning
agency raised by the company entitled the company to a hearing. This right, the court noted, should not
have been explained away on the basis of the Union staff organizer's affidavit. 671 F.2d at 190.
"North Elec., 644 F.2d at 584. The court deferred to the Board the question of whether the party is entitled
to a hearing, noting that the Board is the appropriate body to make the determination in such cases. Id.
"Prestolite, 592 F.2d at 306.
'"NLRB v. Fuelgas Co., 674 F.2d 529, 534 (6th Cir. 1982). The court determined that a single incident
involving an anonymous mark penciled on a sample ballot failed to indicate any unfairness in the election.
The court further noted that the circuit has not hesitated to remand a case where the objecting party could
show some evidence of unfairness or where the Regional Director's failure could have possibly prejudiced
the party's case. Id.
Fall, 19831 RECENT CASES
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the election exceptions have some merit but do not raise substantial factual
issues, delays prompted by the court's decision to remand could be avoided
by the Director's transmitting the entire record in the first instance.
Thus, it appears that only in compelling situations will the court direct
the Board to conduct an evidentiary hearing. The employer's objection must
primafacie raise substantial and material factual disputes that if proven would
warrant setting aside the election. 2
The Sixth Circuit found that the ATR Wire and Cable Company's elec-
tion objections raised, primafacie, substantial issues that controverted the Direc-
tor's report. 63 The most prevalent question, directly disputed by the parties,
was that of Union responsibility for the alleged threats and acts of vandalism. 6"
The cumulative effect of these objections, the court noted, may well have tainted
the election atmosphere and inhibited the employees' free choice.65
These Sixth Circuit decisions indicate that the court is more willing now
than at the time of Tennessee Packers to recognize the importance of fairly
hearing the objecting party even at the expense of less expediently certifying
bargaining units.66 A TR Wire demonstrates that the NLRB policy of avoiding
protracted delays and dilatory tactics in representation election proceedings can-
not operate to deprive an employer of a hearing when it is entitled to one.67
B. Threats by Union Adherents
Since the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act in 1935, the Board
has vacillated concerning the degree to which it will regulate the pre-election
conduct of both employees and unions in order to safeguard the workers' free
62A TR Wire, 671 F.2d at 190. It is well established that courts will insist upon an evidentiary hearing when
a party's objections raise substantial and material issues of fact. See, e.g., Methodist Home v. NLRB,
596 F.2d 1173, 1178 (4th Cir. 1979); NLRB v. S. Prawer & Co., 584 F.2d 1099, 1102 (1st Cir. 1978);
NLRB v. Bristol Spring Mfg. Co., 579 F.2d 704, 706-07 (2d Cir. 1978); Sonoco Prods. Co. v. NLRB,
399 F.2d 835, 839 (9th Cir. 1968).
As a corollary, no hearing is necessary where the Board assumes the alleged facts as true but determines
that the challenged conduct does not constitute legal justification for setting the election aside. NLRB
v. Sun Drug Co., 350 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1966). See also NLRB v. Campbell Prods. Dep't, 623 F.2d 867
(3d Cir. 1980).
03671 F.2d at 190. See supra text accompanying notes 17-37.
11671 F.2d at 190.
"Id. "[Clonduct that the employer has objected to must be considered cumulatively rather than as isolated
incidents . . ." Home Town Foods, Inc. v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 392, 397 (5th Cir. 1969). The ATR Wire
majority noted that the director had dismissed the cumulative effect of the alleged conduct on the election
and focused on the lack of evidence establishing an agency relationship between the Union and the Union
proponents. 671 F.2d at 190.
"Decisions of the Sixth Circuit indicate that the due process rights of an objecting party are indeed violated
when it has raised material and substantial factual disputes but the NLRB or judiciary has denied it an
evidentiary hearing. See, e.g., NLRB v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 663 F.2d 34, 36 (6th Cir. 1981); North
Elec., 644 F.2d at 583; Prestolite Wire, 592 F.2d at 303; NLRB v. Medical Ancillary Serv., 478 F.2d 96,
99 (6th Cir. 1973). Accord NLRB v. White Knight Mfg. Co., 474 F.2d 1064, 1068 (5th Cir. 1973).
"
7The Fifth Circuit used this language in ruling that the NLRB had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in
denying an employer who had raised material factual disputes a hearing on his election objections. United
States Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 373 F.2d 602, 607 (5th Cir. 1967).
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choice of bargaining representation.6" The August, 1982, Board decision in
Midland National Life Insurance Co. 9 espouses the Board's current philosophy.
Relying upon the sophistication of today's workers, the Board will no longer
review the substance of campaign statements."' It will, however, invalidate an
election because of the deceptive manner in which the statements were made.
While an employee can presumably evaluate misleading propaganda, he still
cannot shield himself against fraudulent practices by his employer or union.
While advocating a more lenient standard with respect to campaign misrepre-
sentation, Midland expressly reaffirms the Board's policy of protecting
"against other campaign conduct such as threats, promises, or the like, which
interferes with employee free choice.""
Traditionally, the Board and the courts have been reluctant to set aside
election results on the basis of conduct not attributable to either the employer
or the union." They will, nevertheless, invalidate an election when the coercive
"Originally, the Board concerned itself solely with conduct tending to coerce employees in their election
decisions and chose to leave unregulated campaign propaganda. Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B.
No. 24, 1982-83 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 15,072 (1982). In 1948, the Board announced in General Shoe Corp.,
77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948) that it must conduct elections in laboratory conditions in order to safeguard
the employees' uninhibited choice of bargaining representative. Should these laboratory conditions not
be met, the Board declared that it must rerun the experiment. Id.
Subsequent Board decisions built their conceptual framework upon General Shoe but deviated from
Board policy by reviewing the truth or falsity of campaign statements. See, e.g., Hollywood Ceramics
Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962); The Gummed Prods. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1092 (1955). According to
Hollywood Ceramics, the Board may invalidate an election when a statement constitutes a substantial
departure from the truth and is uttered at a time that prevents the other parties from effectively replying.
140 N.L.R.B. at 224.
In 1977, the Board overruled Hollywood Ceramics, stating that it would rely on the maturity of the
electorate to recognize and discount campaign propaganda. Shopping Kart Food Mkt., 228 N.L.R.B. 1311,
1313 (1977). Thus, the Board would set election results aside only where the parties engaged in fraudulent
practices, abused Board procedures, threatened employees, or improperly granted benefits. Id.
This remained Board policy for only twenty months. The Board reinstated Hollywood Ceramics in
General Knit of California, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 619 (1978). The Board then, within five years, reversed
its position and re-adopted the Shopping Kart policy. Advocates of the Shopping Kart-Midland approach
reason that this rule is realistic, easy to apply, and lends itself to definite, predictable, and speedy results
in conformity with NLRB policy. See Van de Water, New Trends in NLRB Law, 33 LAB. L.J. 635, 640-41
(1982).
The federal courts may greet this most recent Board ruling with skepticism, as indicated by dictum
in Donovan v. Local 719, United Auto., Aerospace, Agricultural Implement Workers of Am., 591 F.
Supp. 54 (N.D. III. 1982). That court found Midland to be unpersuasive, viewing it merely as the latest
of the Board's seemingly incessant shifts regarding campaign ligerature. Id. at 62.
See generally Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the National
Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 38 (1964); Getman, Goldberg & Herman, The Behavioral
Assumptions Underlying NLRB Regulations of Campaign Misrepresentations: An Empirical Evaluation,
28 STAN. L. REV. 263 (1976); O'Dowd, The Hollywood Ceramics-Shopping Kart Merry-Go-Round: Where
Will It Stop? 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 157 (1980); Panello, Shopping Kart Food Market, Inc.: The Cure
for the Hollywood Ceramics Malaise, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 464 (1977); Raskin, Deregulation of Union
Campaigns: Restoring the First Amendment Balance, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1175 (1976).
69263 N.L.R.B. No. 24.
70Id.
71/d.
"1REPORT No. 8, supra note 5, at 158. The Board has explained that it will attribute minimal weight to
the conduct of mere rank-and-file employees, reasoning that such actions have a less coercive impact on
workers. Furthermore, since third parties have no economic interest in conclusive election results, as do
unions and employers, according their conduct greater weight would encourage them to disrupt elections.
Orleans Mfg. Co., 120 N.L.R.B. 630, 633-34 (1958).
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conduct of union adherents has so tainted the pre-election atmosphere that
workers based their votes upon fear rather than conviction." Thus, the conduct
of third parties will be considered in determining whether the employees freely
registered their bargaining choice. Such conduct, however, will be accorded
less weight 74 than that of either party to the election.
7
A TR Wire demonstrates the Sixth Circuit's willingness to closely scrutinize
the impact of union adherent conduct on the ultimate fairness of the election.7 16
While the Regional Director denied ATR Wire a hearing because it failed to
establish an agency relationship between the Union and the proponents,7 the
court's remand indicates that this one factor is not solely determinative of
whether the election should be set aside.
In Zeiglers Refuse Collectors v. NLRB, the Third Circuit enumerated
several factors that the judiciary must consider in determining whether the
actions of union partisans had a substantial impact upon the fairness of the
election. 79 These include the number and severity of threats, the reaction of
those threatened, the number of employees affected, whether the threats were
widely circulated, the proximity of the threats to the time of the election, and
whether the threats were attributable to the union."0
Based upon the considerations set forth in Zeiglers Refuse, it appears that
the Sixth Circuit correctly remanded A TR Wire for an evidentiary hearing.'I
Several circuits disagree with the Board's presumption that unofficial threats are less effective in creating
an atmosphere of fear and reprisal. See, e.g., NLRB v. Southern Paper Box Co., 473 F.2d 208 (8th Cir.
1973); Cross Banking Co. v. NLRB, 453 F.2d 1346, 1347 (1st Cir. 1971).
"Zeiglers Refuse Collectors v. NLRB, 639 F.2d 1000, 1007 (3d Cir. 1981). The court noted that the Board
should focus on determining whether a free election was impossible rather than on the affiliation of those
who created such atmosphere. Id. at 1005.
UId. at 1007.
71In its regulation of pre-election conduct the Board has presumed that statements made by or on behalf
of unions have less impact than those made by the employer. See REPORT No. 8, supra note 5, at 152-53.
For an analysis of the need for balancing the interests of the employer, the union, the Board and
the employees with the constitutional right of free speech, see Wimberly & Steckel, NLRB Campaign
Laboratory Conditions Doctrine & Free Speech Revisited, 32 MERCER L. REv. 535 (1981).
In originally passing the Act, Congress deemed it unnecessary to afford employers protection against
interference, coercion, and restraint by labor organizations and employees. Congress reasoned that such
practice would contravene the essential purpose of the NLRA. See S. Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
16 (1935).
In 1948 Congress reversed this position and enacted the Labor Management Relations Act. 29 U.S.C.
§§ 141-97 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). This Act created a number of union unfair labor practices. 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b) (1976). For a discussion of the legislative history of this enactment see Reilly, The Legislative
History of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 285 (1960).





"Compare NLRB v. Eskimo Radiator Mfg. Co., 688 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir. 1982) (No evidence that any
employee was deterred from voting or voted against his personal choice due to conduct not attributable
to the union); NLRB v. S. Metal Serv., Inc., 606 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1979) (Coerced employee stated that
the remark had no effect on his vote).
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Fifteen ATR Wire employees declared in sworn statements that they had been
threatened with bodily harm or with disruption of the work routine.8 2 They
testified that the general pre-election atmosphere was tense and that they were
afraid to express support for the company. They further alleged that their per-
sonal property had been vandalized.83 The cumulative effect of this conduct
may have indeed rendered a fair election impossible.
Eliason Corp. v. NLRB, " decided by the Sixth Circuit seven months afer
A TR Wire, more explicitly defines the guidelines that the circuit should follow
in evaluating the impact of union adherent conduct on the validity of election
results. 5 The court stated in relevant part:
[T]he threat on one worker's life, the threat to Mexican Americans as
a group, the small size of the bargaining unit, and the large percentage
of abstentions raise a substantial question of intimidation. This is par-
ticularly true when combined with Eliason's contention that the union
adherent was active on behalf of the Union prior to the election .... 86
A TR Wire, when compared with Eliason, may represent the outer limits
of the Sixth Circuit's willingness to remand a case for an evidentiary hearing
on objections questioning the fairness of an election. Eliason seems to command
a greater degree of severity, for example: death threats as opposed to property
damage or bodily harm; a large number of abstentions as opposed to A TR
Wire's five; and seventeen eligible voters as opposed to 364 at the ATR Wire
Kentucky plant.
A TR Wire, tempered by Eliason, establishes that the Sixth Circuit will
grant an employer an evidentiary hearing when its workers may have been
hampered in exercising their freedom of choice and when the employer might
otherwise be compelled to bargain with a union not properly selected by his
employees. Threats of bodily harm or property damage coupled with a large
number of abstentions in a small bargaining unit, or employee affidavits alleging
that the pre-election atmosphere was tense are standards guiding the Sixth Circuit
in its determination of the fairness of representation elections.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Sixth Circuit, in Tennessee Packers, established a rigid policy of limiting
the number of evidentiary hearings on post-election exceptions. It required a
12671 F.2d at 189.
"3Id.
"688 F.2d 22 (6th Cir. 1982).
"Id. at 23. Although Midland expressly reaffirms the Board policy of reviewing coercive conduct, it might
be fair to conclude that any campaign statement short of fraud might require more severe coercive conduct
before it will set aside an election. Thus, Eliason, decided one month after Midland, appears to reflect
the court's attempted compliance with the newly espoused Midland standard. See supra notes 68-71 and
accompanying text. This may account for the Sixth Circuit demanding in Eliason, a showing of more
egregious conduct before it infers that the employees were unable to exercise their free choice.
Z61d.
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party crying "foul" ' 87 to specifically define its controversies and support its
conclusions with evidence.8" The Tennessee Packers decision explained that
delays in certifying election results must be zealously avoided so as to comply
with the policy of the National Labor Relations Act.89
Recent decisions of the Sixth Circuit, as exemplified by Prestolite Wire,
North Electric, A TR Wire, and Eliason, represent an attempt to recognize the
objecting party's due process rights. Thus, in all but narrowly defined cir-
cumstances the Board must either review all the evidence relied upon by the
Regional Director or grant the objecting party an evidentiary hearing before
it compels an employer to bargain.
These decisions also represent the circuit's attempt to more carefully guard
the employee's right to exercise a free choice in representation elections. Thus,
the court will remand for a hearing or review of the record when the pre-election
conduct, even that of union advocates, may have tainted the results of the
election.
Through these decisions, the Sixth Circuit has formulated consistent and
reasonable guidelines concerning post-election objections. Only in adhering to
these guidelines will the purposes of the National Labor Relations Act be served.
Inconsistencies and complexities merely provide those seeking to avoid the results
of elections numerous opportunities for protracted delays.90 "The utility of
elections lies in final, definitive, and unchallenged results; elections become
useless when the results are challenged, uncertain or rejected. Elections are in-
tended to establish and stabilize representation, not leave it unsettled and in
dispute." 9
PATRICIA A. McINTYRE
"Funke, Board Regulations of Pre-Election Conduct, 36 TEX. L. REv. 893, 895 (1958).
"1379 F.2d at 178. See supra text accompanying note 44.
89Id.
"Samoff, supra note 42, at 236-37.
"Id. at 228.
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